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Abstract
In his Système de la nature ou Essai sur les corps organisés (originally published in Latin 
in 1751 as Dissertatio inauguralis metaphysica de universali naturae systemate, under the 
pseudonym Dr Baumann), Pierre-Louis Moreau de Maupertuis, President of the Ber-
lin Academy of Sciences and a natural philosopher with a strong interest in the modes 
of transmission of ‘genetic’ information, described living minima which he termed 
molecules, “endowed with desire, memory and intelligence.” Now, Maupertuis was a 
Leibnizian of sorts; his molecules possessed higher-level, ‘mental’ properties, recalling 
La Mettrie’s statement in L’Homme-Machine, that Leibnizians have “rather spiritualized 
matter than materialized the soul.” But Maupertuis also debated this issue with 
Diderot, who critiqued this theory in the additions to his 1753 Pensées sur l’interpréta-
tion de la nature. Where Maupertuis attributes higher-level properties to his living 
minima, Diderot argues that these can only be ‘organizational’, i.e., properties of the 
whole. At issue here is the degree of commitment to a form of materialism.
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In early modern discussions of the nature, function and operation 
of organic bodies (animal or human), including comparisons of 
these with various sorts of machines, both real and imagined, it is 
extremely rare to find distinctions between the two being made on 
the basis of ontological claims about ‘Life’ itself or the nature of 
the frontier separating the living from the non-living, animate  matter 
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from inanimate matter. There are accounts of Life as ‘vital heat’ or 
fermentation (as in Fernel), as deriving from animal spirits or fibres, 
and so forth, but almost no explicit claims about the difference 
between Life and its opposite (with the notable exception of Stahl 
in his polemic with Leibniz). However, there is a marked shift from 
discussions of the ‘minimum’ as a mathematical, physical or meta-
physical point to discussions of what we might call ‘living minima’, 
the smallest constituents of organic life—from the metaphysics of 
Bruno and Leibniz to the bio-metaphysics of Gassendi, La Mettrie, 
Maupertuis and Diderot. (Leibniz himself did not speak of ‘living 
minima’ and indeed avoided describing atoms of substance as ‘liv-
ing’, since Life is a property of corporeal entities and conversely, 
minima are not alive; yet, as I discuss below, his doctrine of the 
monad was frequently read in the eighteenth century as providing 
a basis for a vital materialism, or at least a biologically motivated 
metaphysics.1) In the seventeenth century the term ‘molecule’ emerges 
as a name for these living minima, and this essay examines a par-
ticular debate on this sense of ‘molecule’ and vital properties.
The term molecule is derived from the diminutive of the Latin 
moles, or mass (in Latin, a molecula). Pierre Gassendi used the term 
molecula synonymously with the Lucretian term semina rerum, with 
the difference that for Lucretius these ‘seeds’ were simply atoms, 
whereas for Gassendi they are composites or compounds of atoms.2 
Indeed, one should not project the concept of molecule backwards 
onto early atomism (as for instance an equivalent of concilium), 
since ‘molecule’ is the notion of a substantial individual composed 
of atoms.3 Molecules emerge in the chemical vocabulary of the 
1) Georges Canguilhem, “Note sur les rapports de la théorie cellulaire et de la philo-
sophie de Leibniz, ” Appendix II in La connaissance de la vie, revised edition (Paris, 
1980), 188.
2) Olivier R. Bloch, La Philosophie de Gassendi. Nominalisme, matérialisme et métaphy-
sique (e Hague, 1971), 252 n.75. 
3) Henk Kubbinga, L’histoire du concept de « molécule » (Paris, 2001), 109. For the 
impact of semina rerum on early modern matter theory, see Hiro Hirai’s Le concept de 
semence dans les théories de la matière à la Renaissance de Ficin à Gassendi ( Turnhout, 
2005). On the meaning of ‘molecule’ in seventeenth-century chemistry, matter theory 
and philosophy, see Bloch, La Philosophie de Gassendi, 252-259; Antonio Clericuzio, 
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1630s-1640s; while Gassendi appears to have been the first to use 
the term, he was preceded in articulating a molecular theory of 
matter by Isaac Beeckman (1588-1637), in notebooks written between 
1614 and 1629 (particularly an entry of 1620 discovered by Henk 
Kubbinga4), where Beeckman’s technical term is homogenea physica. 
But for our purposes it is significant that Gassendi explicitly addresses 
the ‘property’ question, that is, do the molecules or ‘moleculae’ pos-
sess sensitive or vital properties?5, even though he wavers on the issue. 
According to some interpreters, Gassendi’s molecules do not bor-
row the properties of sensible objects, whereas others consider that 
his notion of molecule specifically “helps bridge the gap between 
sensible qualities and atoms.”6
The appearance of new conceptual personae7 such as the ‘mole-
cule’ thus creates new worries for natural philosophy, notably the 
tension between the reductionist definition of minimal entities and 
the correspondingly anti-reductionist, expanded definition of the 
attributes of these entities (from Francis Glisson’s organic fibres pos-
sessing ‘appetition’ to molecules possessing sensitive and indeed cog-
nitive properties, as discussed here).8 This double-barreled definitional 
Elements, Principles and Corpuscles: A Study of Atomism and Chemistry in the Seventeenth 
Century (Dordrecht, 2001), 63-71; Kubbinga, Histoire du concept de « molécule », chs. 
6-8.
4) Kubbinga, “Les premières théories ‘moléculaires’: Isaac Beeckman (1620) et 
 Sébastien Basson (1621),” Revue d’histoire des sciences, 39 (1984), 215-233, here, 219.
5) Gassendi, Animadversiones in Decimum Librum Diogenis Laerti qui est de vita, mori-
bus placitisque Epicuri, with appendix, Philosophiae Epicuri syntagma (Lyon, 1649), 
e.g. 398.
6) Compare Bloch, La Philosophie de Gassendi, 253 to Clericuzio, Elements, Principles 
and Corpuscles, 65.
7) I borrow this term (“personnage conceptuel”) from Gilles Deleuze & Félix  Guattari, 
Qu’est-ce-que la philosophie? (Paris, 1991), ch. 3. A conceptual persona can be the 
cogito for Descartes, Socrates for Plato, or the Antinomies for Kant, but can also be 
a highly overdetermined, idiosyncratic sense of ‘atom’, ‘molecule’ or ‘organism’. Put 
differently, the molecule for Maupertuis or Diderot plays a very different role than 
it does in the emergence of, e.g., molecular biology as discussed in J.C. Speakman, 
“e Molecule—e Evolution of a Concept,” Philosophical Journal, 2 (1965), 55-75.
8) at the term ‘molecule’ could carry with it unwanted reductionist baggage is 
evi denced by Goethe’s refusal to employ it in his translation of Diderot’s Neveu de 
Rameau; see Roland Eluerd, “Note sur fibre et molécule dans Le Neveu de Rameau,” 
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and indeed, ontological problem was at the heart of a debate between 
two prominent figures of the Enlightenment, Pierre-Louis Moreau 
de Maupertuis (1698–1759) and Denis Diderot (1713-1784). Mau-
pertuis was a major scientific figure (member of the Académie Royale 
des Sciences from the age of 25, its director between 1742 and 
1745, and most famously President from 1746 onwards of the  Berlin 
Academy of Sciences, appointed by Frederick II) who we primar-
ily associate today with the principle of least action, his expedition 
to Lapland, which provided experimental confirmation of key tenets 
of Newtonian physics, and to some extent his reflections on gen-
eration and species in works such as the Dissertation physique à 
l’occasion du Nègre Blanc (1744) and its expanded version, the Vénus 
physique (1745).9 Diderot was the chief editor of the Encyclopédie, 
a translator of medical works, author of several mathematical essays 
and, significantly, a regular presence at Guillaume-François Rouelle’s 
chemistry lectures at the Jardin du Roi (now the Jardin des Plan-
tes), between 1754 and 1757.10 I shall not discuss the overlapping 
biographies of Maupertuis and Diderot further here.11
Their debate centred precisely on the nature of ‘molecules’ and 
their minimal or expanded definition. The textual history of the 
debate runs as follows: in 1751, Maupertuis published (supposedly 
L’Information Grammaticale, 52 (1992), 14-16 (thanks to Susan Bernofsky for this 
example).
9) Much of what we know of Maupertuis’ biography comes from his friend Lau-
rent Angliviel de La Beaumelle’s admittedly rather hagiographical Vie de Maupertuis 
(Paris, 1856), written shortly after Maupertuis’ death, but published posthumously. 
e recent studies by Beeson, Terrall and Shank (cited below) are all of high quality, 
with different emphases. 
10) Diderot actually served as secretary during many of the lectures, taking notes 
and even preparing some of the lectures for Rouelle, which were first published as 
Introduction à la chymie, manuscrit inédit de Diderot publié avec une notice sur les cours 
de Rouelle, ed. Charles Henry (Paris, 1887); now available as Cours de chimie de Mr 
Rouelle, in Diderot, Œuvres complètes, ed. H. Dieckmann, J. Proust & J. Varloot (Paris, 
1975-), vol. IX.
11) A recent discovery worth noting, however, is a letter from Diderot to  Maupertuis 
accompanying a copy of his Lettre sur les aveugles, in 1749. It was published in 
Anne-Marie Chouillet, “Trois lettres inédites de Diderot,” Recherches sur Diderot et 
l’Encyclopédie, 11:1 (1991), 8-18.
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in Erlangen—actually in Berlin) a Latin treatise entitled Dissertatio 
inauguralis metaphysica de universali naturae systemate, under the 
pseudonym Dr Baumann.12 In 1754, he translated the text into 
French and published it, now with a more specifically ‘biological’ 
title: Essai sur la formation des corps organisés (the translation was 
signed Abbé Trublet). The final version of the text appeared in 
French with a title closer to the original, Système de la nature, in 
the 1756 edition of Maupertuis’ Œuvres. Diderot critically discussed 
the ‘Erlangen dissertation’ (and outed its author) in the second edi-
tion of his Pensées sur l’interprétation de la nature in 1754 (the first 
edition had appeared one year earlier), in sections L-LI. Mauper-
tuis replied to Diderot’s criticisms in a Réponse aux objections de M. 
Diderot included in the third and final version of his essay, in his 
1756 Œuvres.13
In his System of Nature or Essay on Organized Bodies, Maupertuis 
asks his readers to imagine a molecule “endowed with desire, aver-
sion and memory.”14 The debate between Maupertuis and Diderot 
concerning the nature of what they termed ‘molecule’ is in fact a 
debate over “endowment” or “attribution” of properties: should it 
be applied to the element or the organizational whole? On the 
 surface, this exchange or polemic is also a case of the two authors 
trading accusations of atheism with each other (for the definition 
of matter as possessing dynamic, organizational, indeed ‘intellec-
tive’ properties is of course a dangerous one). But deeper down it 
is also an opportunity for us to witness a moment of self- delimitation 
12) is was also the basis for an anonymous German translation, Versuch von der 
Bildung der Körpers (Leipzig, 1761), now very rare; cf. Mary Terrall, e Man Who 
Flattened the Earth: Maupertuis and the Sciences in the Enlightenment (Chicago, 2002), 
322n.
13) e edition used is Pierre-Louis Moreau de Maupertuis, Système de la nature. Essai 
sur la formation des corps organisés and Réponse aux objections de M. Diderot, in Œuvres, 
2 vols. (Lyon, 1756). e Système and the Réponse are in vol. 2; hereafter cited as Sys-
tème followed by section number (in Roman numerals), and Réponse, followed by page 
number. All translations are mine unless otherwise indicated.
14) “douée de désir, d’aversion, et de mémoire” (Système, § XIV); the term ‘endowed’ 
appears in §§ XXXI and LXVI. In sections XIX and XXVII Maupertuis uses instead the 
term “accorder”: matter was “granted” properties. At the end of the book he returns to 
the language of endowment, speaking of “originarily endowed elements” (§ LIV, 173).
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of materialism. In the early twentieth century, Paul Janet, one 
of the first commentators to focus on Diderot philosophically, fol-
lowed a hint of La Mettrie’s, for whom the Leibnizians, “with their 
Monads, … spiritualized matter rather than materializing the soul” 
(“Ils ont plutôt spiritualisé la matière, que matérialisé l’âme”15) and 
described Maupertuis’ ‘endowment strategy’ as a disguised form of 
spiritualism. Janet added that Diderot’s apparent rebuttal was merely 
a strategic (one might say ‘ideological’) one, and that metaphysi-
cally his position is actually no different from Maupertuis’. Janet 
opposes the materialism of the atomists, in which all qualitative 
changes in the universe are the product of the encounter and com-
bination of primary elements whose essential properties are exten-
sion and solidity, to the expanded materialism of Diderot, which 
he identifies with Maupertuis’ endowed molecules, given that in 
both Diderot and Maupertuis matter possesses additional, mental 
properties which Janet traces back to Leibniz.16
I will briefly examine the Newtonian and especially Leibnizian 
aspects and background of Maupertuis’ thesis, given that his con-
cept of molecule has been described as a ‘materialization of the 
monad’, then turn to the core of his discussion of molecules and 
their properties, after which I consider Diderot’s challenge to Mau-
pertuis, that higher-level properties belong to the level of organisa-
tion (the overall physiological structure) rather than that of the 
element. But, as I discuss in closing, their debate involves sig nificant 
interpretive commitments with respect to materialism, as  Maupertuis’ 
project, far from being simplistic, was motivated by the question 
of how the existence of a living entity could be grounded other 
than by an appeal to the mystical effects of a life-force; an  invocation 
to the equilibrium existing between the workings of the macrocosm 
and the microcosm; or a mechanistic reduction to  properties such 
as size, shape and motion? This is where the strategy of the endowed 
molecule comes into play, the attribution of a self-organizing  activity 
15) Julien Offray de La Mettrie, L’Homme-Machine [1748], ed. A. Vartanian (Prince-
ton, 1960), 149.
16) Paul Janet, “La philosophie de Diderot. le dernier mot d’un matérialiste,” e 
Nineteenth Century, IX (April 1881), 697.
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to the molecule, in which “the materials are the workers themselves.”17 
Hence the debate between Maupertuis and Diderot on the status 
of ‘molecules’ also highlights some conceptual decisions concerning 
materialism, emergence and reduction in the context of eighteenth-
century proto-biology and its metaphysical commitments.18
1. e Newtonian and Leibnizian Context
In order to properly locate the debate between Maupertuis and 
Diderot, we have to first provide some elements regarding the New-
tonian and Leibnizian context, as these large-scale programs in nat-
ural philosophy also had direct influence on the formulation of 
positions concerning generation or development, and reflections on 
the nature of living beings. It is well known that there was a con-
founding variety of Newtonianisms operative in the eighteenth cen-
tury. According to the “taxonomy” suggested by Robert Schofield,19 
France alone comprised three different strands of ‘Leibnizian New-
tonianism’, those of Maupertuis, Fontenelle and Voltaire, which share 
a characteristic interpretation of the monad as subject and  singularity, 
as distinguished e.g. from the ‘Baconian Newtonianism’ which was 
predominant in the Netherlands with Boerhaave and  Musschenbroek, 
characterized by an emphasis on force and regularity.20  Maupertuis 
is both a major figure of French Newtonianism (his early Discours 
sur les différentes figures des astres represents the first public defense 
17) Maupertuis, Système, § LXI, 180.
18) I discuss the relation between certain projects in the ‘proto-biology’ of the mid-
eighteenth century, notably natural history in Diderot and Buffon, and ontologi-
cal considerations (chiefly materialism) in “‘Cabinet d’Histoire Naturelle’, or: e 
Interplay of Nature and Artifice in Diderot’s Naturalism,” Perspectives on Science, 
17 (2009), 58-77.
19) R.E. Schofield, “An Evolutionary Taxonomy of Eighteenth-Century Newtonian-
isms,” Studies in Eighteenth-Century Culture, 7 (1978), 175-192. For a full account of 
Newtonianism and its offshoots in France in the eighteenth century, see the remarkable 
study by J.B. Shank, e Newton Wars and the Beginning of the French Enlightenment 
(Chicago, 2008).
20) Voltaire conveyed Maupertuis’ Newtonian heritage, which he approved on deis-
tic grounds, in the nickname “Sir Isaac Maupertuis” (Voltaire, Œuvres complètes, ed. 
L. Moland [Paris, 1877-1882], XXXV, 54).
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of attractionism in the Paris Academy, where Cartesian ideology 
still dominated) and perhaps the main figure involved in succes-
sively grafting more and more Leibnizian elements into this frame-
work. Diderot’s more Baconian heritage is manifest in the very title 
of the work discussed here, Pensées sur l’Interprétation de la Nature, 
that is, Thoughts on the Interpretation of Nature (recall that the full 
title of Bacon’s main work is Novum Organum sive de interpreta-
tione naturae). But Newtonianism itself, whether by using gravity 
and attraction as an analogical basis for studying vital properties, 
or in the more quantitative vein of the English ‘medical Newto-
nians’ such as Archibald Pitcairne, offered various possibilities for 
deriving a system of generation.
However, Maupertuis explicitly states that Newtonian attraction 
does not sufficiently account for organic phenomena, or even “the 
simplest chemical operations.”21 The laws of movement are not suf-
ficient to explain the reproduction of living beings—which is his 
motivation for writing the Système. In the earlier Vénus physique he 
had formulated the hypothesis that natural organisms were formed 
by attraction alone; now, in the context of an epigenetic theory, he 
acknowledges that the force of attraction alone cannot sufficiently 
account for the production of specifically organized bodies: “A blind, 
uniform attraction distributed throughout the parts of matter would 
not explain how these parts arrange themselves to form even the 
simplest organized body. . . . Why shouldn’t they unite at random?”22 
That is, the same force of gravitation-attraction which controls the 
behavior of bodies in space governs the formation of organic  bodies. 
However, as the force of attraction is transformed, in Maupertuis’ 
terminology, into affinity, it loses the characteristics of the simple 
mechanical phenomenon of the Newtonian model and gains “Leib-
nizian” qualities (justifying Schofield’s category of ‘Leibnizian New-
tonianism’). Maupertuis will add properties to his living minima 
which they would not possess in a strict Newtonian model. His 
21) Système, § III, 141.
22) “Une attraction uniforme et aveugle répartie dans toutes les parties de la matière, 
ne saurait servir à expliquer comment ces parties s’arrangent pour former le corps 
dont l’organisation est la plus simple. . . . Pourquoi ne s’unissent-elles pas pêle-mêle?” 
(Maupertuis, Système, § XIV, 146-147).
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interest is to see a kind of Thinking at work—an informational 
model of genetic transmission as the transmission of non-material 
‘coding’ or ‘content’—but our concern for now is simply to map 
out his arguments for the “endowed molecule.”
The Newtonian context in its different forms could be hybrid-
ized with Leibnizian elements, whether as a ‘vitalized’ physics or a 
more explicitly radical materialist project, given that “both [Leib-
nizianism and Newtonianism] could be imagined as offering a phi-
losophy of nature that made innate material forces in bodies the 
causal agent in a deterministic universe governed by impersonal, 
mathematical laws.”23 Leibnizian metaphysics and theories of gen-
eration thus had a great impact on eighteenth-century thought, and 
are frequently considered to be major influences in the formulation 
of Diderot’s materialism among others.24 In a pattern familiar from 
the controversies over Cartesian physiology (when some of  Descartes’ 
disciples such as Regius steered his system towards materialism) or 
thinking matter (when Locke’s skeptical approach was deliberately 
misread as an explicitly materialist credo), Leibniz’s insistence that 
one not confuse or blend the physical and the metaphysical levels 
of his system; that mechanical science and monadic metaphysics 
were distinct, was disregarded.25 Thus his idea of the organism as 
a ‘machine of nature’ was turned into a biological concept: even 
the vitalist physician Théophile de Bordeu named monads (along 
with Buffon’s organic molecules) in his list of the main “hypothe-
ses on the elements of bodies,”26 in a trend extending at least as far 
as Johannes Müller in the nineteenth century. To reiterate an ear-
lier point in part, Leibniz himself does not hold that there are ‘basic’ 
organic components, since machines of nature are, after all, machines 
23) Shank, e Newton Wars, 433.
24) See (with some reservations) Yvon Belaval, “Note sur Diderot et Leibniz” and 
“Diderot lecteur de Leibniz ?”, in his Études leibniziennes (Paris, 1976) and for more 
extensive textual consideration, but unreliable interpretive claims, Claire Fauvergue, 
Diderot lecteur et interprète de Leibniz (Paris, 2006).
25) Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz, Philosophischen Schriften, ed. C.I. Gerhardt, 7 vols. 
(reprint, Hildesheim/New York, 1978), IV, 434f., VII, 343; Mathematische Schriften, 
ed. C.I. Gerhardt, 7 vols. (reprint, Hildesheim/New York, 1962), VI, 134f., 242f.
26) éophile de Bordeu, Recherches sur les maladies chroniques (Paris, 1775), 333-334.
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to infinity—although this did not prevent ‘vital’ or otherwise mate-
rialist readings of his concept—but of course, he acknowledges that 
he was inspired by living beings for his concept (much as Aristot-
le’s concept of substance is inspired by biological entities without 
being itself biological).27
On the occasion of the Berlin Academy’s essay competition on 
monads in 1748—which was to give rise to bitter institutional infight-
ing, as the Academy was torn between Leibnizians such as Wolff 
and Newtonians such as Euler, with unfortunate effects such as 
Maupertuis’ inappropriate usage of his authority to censure the work 
of the Wolffian Johann Samuel König, who had linked Maupertuis’ 
principle of least action to Leibniz28—there was a great deal of ‘nat-
uralized’ interpretation of the monad concept, including Mauper-
tuis but also Condillac’s 1748 prize essay for the competition.29 
Maupertuis’ own brief essay on the topic declares that “Monads 
might in principle be nothing other than the primary  elements of 
matter, endowed with perception and force,”30 a description that is 
rather close to Diderot’s in his Encyclopédie entry “Leib nizianisme”: 
the monad is “the real atom of nature” (“l’atome réel de la nature”31), 
itself closely related to the “sensing and living molecules” he will 
postulate in Le Rêve de D’Alembert. Hence  Canguilhem could declare 
with some justice that “in France in the eighteenth century, it was 
27) anks to Stephen Gaukroger and Justin E.H. Smith for helpful discussions on 
this point.
28) See Terrall, e Man Who Flattened the Earth, 292-309; Shank, e Newton Wars, 
474-475.
29) Condillac’s election to the Academy in 1749 may have owed a lot to Maupertuis, 
to whom he wrote on Christmas Day of that year to express his pleasure and gratitude 
at being elected (Condillac, Œuvres philosophiques, ed. G. Le Roy [Paris, 1947], II, 
533). His prize essay was only properly identified and published recently: Les mona-
des, mémoire présenté à l’Académie de Berlin, critical edition by Laurence Bongie, in 
Studies on Voltaire and the Eighteenth Century, 187 (1980).
30) “Les monades pourraient n’être dans leur principe que les éléments premiers de la 
matière, dotés de perception et de force” (Maupertuis, Sur les monades, Letter VIII in 
Lettres de Maupertuis [Dresden, 1752], 57). For discussion see Annie Ibrahim, “Matière 
inerte et matière vivante. La théorie de la perception chez Maupertuis,” Dix-huitième 
siècle, 24 (1992), 95-103.
31) Diderot, Œuvres complètes, VII, 692.
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above all through Maupertuis that the philosophy of Leibniz informed 
and oriented speculation concerning the growth and structure of 
living beings.”32
Now, Maupertuis himself was not a self-proclaimed Leibnizian, 
not least for the institutional reasons alluded to above. And his own 
explicit contribution to the debate on monads, the eighth of his 
Lettres, entitled Sur les monades,33 a ‘casual’ piece in the manner of 
Voltaire, is somewhat of an obfuscation. But one needs only to 
compare Maupertuis’ statement quoted above, that the monad could 
very well be understood as the basic element of matter, endowed 
with perception and force, with the views of Samuel Formey, the 
Perpetual Secretary of the Berlin Academy, to see that Maupertuis’ 
molecules look suspiciously like ‘materializations of the monad’; as 
Roselyne Rey put it, “what was a principle of change within sub-
stance has become a property of living matter.”34 Formey devoted 
an essay to the topic of matter theory in response to some of the 
submissions for the Berlin Academy of Sciences prize competition 
on monads: the 1747 Recherches sur les éléments de la matière. Tar-
getting thinkers such as the anonymous author of the Gedancken 
von den Elementen der Cörper… (Berlin, 1746), Formey argues that 
deliberately or not, they confuse the system of the monads with 
that of the divisibility of matter.35 He insists that the genuine “ele-
ments of matter” are not accessible through microscopes36; the real-
ity of these elements must be demonstrated metaphysically (like 
Leibniz did for Clarke). Atoms cannot be these elements because 
they are merely bits of extension, not simple beings (“êtres sim-
ples”) possessed of a “principle of action”37 which explains change 
in Nature. The experiential fact that bodies can be active or  passive 
32) Canguilhem,“Note sur les rapports,” 188.
33) Lettres de Maupertuis, 55-57.
34) Roselyne Rey, “L’âme, le corps et le vivant,” in Mirko Grmek, ed., Histoire de la 
pensée médicale en Occident, vol. 2 : De la Renaissance aux Lumières (Paris, 1997), 122.
35) Samuel Formey, Recherches sur les éléments de la matière, § II, in Formey, Mélanges 
philosophiques, vol. 1 (Leyden, 1754), 263-265.
36) Ibid., § XII, 277.
37) Ibid., § LIV, 327.
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is explained, Formey continues in proper Leibnizian fashion, by 
their possessing such a principle, which is in fact force.
Thus Maupertuis’ notion of the molecule belongs to a broader 
context of materialist and/or biologically oriented interpretations of 
Leibnizian monads. A desire to account for the phenomena of gen-
eration leads him to look for forces and properties other than basic 
Newtonian attraction, to account for the regular production of orga-
nized bodies, i.e., organisms.
2. Maupertuis’ Argument
Maupertuis introduces his argument for ‘endowment’ in section XIV 
of his book:
If we wish to be able to formulate anything about this, even if we can only con-
ceive it through analogy, we must have recourse to a principle of intelligence, to 
something akin to what we call desire, aversion, memory. 38
“This” is the question, why do the parts unite to form a body, and 
especially, why this body rather than another? Notice the admission 
that this can only be conceived “through analogy.” Maupertuis adds 
later on that the analogy is intended to complement trials through 
experience, when dealing with species other than our own, and, 
moving towards increasingly abstract or remote cases, he explains 
that God did endow the smallest parts of matter with properties 
like (“semblable”) what we refer to as “desire, aversion and mem-
ory” in us (it is not clear on what basis he selects these three prop-
erties, which sound faintly monadological but could also be derived 
from a variety of other sources).39 Lastly, he adds that we should 
not worry about attributing a principle of intelligence to matter, 
for it is in fact not an intelligence like our own.40
38) “Si l’on veut dire sur cela quelque chose qu’on conçoive, quoiqu’encore on ne le 
conçoive que sur quelque analogie, il faut avoir recours à quelque principe d’intelli-
gence, à quelque chose de semblable à ce que nous appellons désir, aversion, mémoire” 
(Système, § XIV, 147, reiterated in §§ XXVIII, 155-156 and XXXI, 157-158, and again 
in § LXVI, 183 (with God now explicitly named as the ‘donor’).
39) Ibid., § LIV, 172.
40) Ibid., § LXII, 181.
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Yet Maupertuis nonetheless fears that attributing a kind of intel-
ligence to matter would be viewed as tantamount to materialism, 
precisely in the vein of Lockean thinking matter. And he was not 
mistaken: the attribution of generative, organizational and intellec-
tive powers to matter earned him the epithet of ‘materialist’ (or Spi-
nozist, or hylozoist) in a variety of responses ranging from an 
anonymous review in the Bibliothèque raisonnée to very visible state-
ments by the likes of Rousseau in the “Profession de foi du vicaire 
savoyard” (1762) and Kant in The Only Possible Proof in Support of 
the Demonstration of the Existence of God (1763).41 After all, shortly 
after Maupertuis published (anonymously) the first, Latin version 
of the Système de la nature, Fontenelle famously warned in his Théo-
rie des tourbillons cartésiens that attributing attraction to matter was 
a small step away from granting it the power to think:
e Newtonians can say that, just as bodies only move by the will of God, it is 
possible that by this same will they mutually attract one another; but the differ-
ence is a major one. In the first case, God’s will merely enacts an essential prop-
erty of matter, its mobility, and inclines its natural indifference towards rest or 
motion, towards motion. But in the second case, how could bodies have a dispo-
sition to attract each other by themselves? God’s will would have no relation to 
their nature, and would be wholly arbitrary, which is quite contrary to the order 
of the universe witnessed everywhere. If we grant this arbitrariness, we destroy any 
philosophical proof of the spirituality of the soul. God could just as well have 
granted thought to matter, as attraction.42
41) Anonymous review of the Vénus physique, Bibliothèque raisonnée, 35 (1745), 312. 
For Rousseau’s blanket dismissal of the idea of the ‘living molecule’, see “Profession 
de foi du vicaire savoyard,” in Emile, ou de l’éducation, Œuvres complètes, ed. B. Gag-
nebin & M. Raymond, vol. 4 (Paris, 1969), 575; Kant specifically targets Maupertuis’ 
molecules possessing memory, desire, aversion, even if by analogy only, as a major case 
of the dangers of hylozoism (Der einzig mögliche Beweisgrund zu einer Demonstration 
des Daseins Gottes, as cited by John Zammito, “Kant’s Early Views on Epigenesis: e 
role of Maupertuis,” in Justin E.H. Smith, ed., e Problem of Animal Generation in 
Early Modern Philosophy [Cambridge, 2006], 317–354, here, 343).
42) Bernard Le Bovier de Fontenelle, éorie des tourbillons Cartésiens; avec des réflexions 
sur l’attraction [1752], Réflexions sur la théorie précédente, § III, in Œuvres de Fontenelle 
(Paris, 1829), III, 71, emphasis mine. For brief discussion of the last sentence, see 
Pierre Sudaka, “L’intervention de Maupertuis dans la philosophie,” in Olivier Bloch, 
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How does Maupertuis avoid the charge of materialism? Rather than 
claiming that the property of thought belongs to matter in toto, he 
makes an excursus into animal-machines and reminds the reader 
that the earliest (and most orthodox) theologians granted intelli-
gence to animals. Now, he adds, thanks to the microscope, we dis-
cover smaller and smaller animals every day, which establishes that 
animals are aggregates (literally “heaps,” “amas”) of matter of vary-
ing sizes. Why not grant, then, that intelligence might be present 
in infinitely small parcels of matter?43 This is sufficient to dispel 
theological worries, in his view, so he now turns to the properly 
philosophical objection of dualism, according to which body and 
soul are separate substances, and intelligence belongs to the soul (§ 
XXI, 150). Maupertuis is willing to accept the distinction between 
extension and thought as self-evident but he adds that these are 
properties of a subject “whose specific essence is unknown to us” (§ 
XXII, 151). If we wish to attend empirically to natural phenom-
ena (§ XXIII, 152), specifically the formation of organized bodies, 
and we apply the rule of the reduction of phenomena to the small-
est number of principles, we see that the Cartesian principles are 
insufficient (§ XXV, 154). Maupertuis quickly adds that he is not 
calling Genesis into doubt—Scripture adequately explains “how all 
these bodies emerged out of nothingness” (ibid.)—but rather the 
rules of the preservation of the world after creation (§ XXVII, 155). 
In order that bodies as they exist today can have formed, Mauper-
tuis suggests that matter must possess properties other than merely 
physical ones: we must “grant it some degree of intelligence, desire, 
aversion, and memory” (§ XXVII, 155; in his response to Diderot 
he adds “instinct”44). Diderot will explicitly reject this attribution 
of ‘mental’ properties to material entities.
But notice that Maupertuis is not so much trying to engage in 
high metaphysics, postulating some kind of higher intelligence embed-
ded in matter; he is endeavoring to explain how an organism becomes 
ed., Actes de la journée Maupertuis (Paris, 1975), 61; David Beeson, Maupertuis: An 
Intellectual Biography (Oxford, 1992), 51.
43) Maupertuis, Système, § XVI, 148; § XVIII, 149.
44) Réponse aux objections de M. Diderot, 215.
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what it is, how a certain quantity of matter goes through a series 
of transitions to become an organized body, such as a fetus.45 In 
order to do so, he attributes self-organizing properties to the mol-
ecule. This act of attribution is one possible materialist approach 
to the question of generation or development, whereas the other 
emphasizes the primacy of organizational features, as we will see 
with Diderot; but both have in common the rejection of Cartesian 
matter theory, for matter in this new configuration (in which both 
Leibniz and Spinoza play a role, as they do explicitly for someone 
like John Toland46) is already a bearer of its own internal disposi-
tions, starting with movement and moving upwards from there to 
cognitive properties. The molecule is not describable in terms of 
passive, Cartesian matter qua extension but rather active, Leibniz-
ian matter47; even in Spinoza there was no recognition of a  particular 
potency or drive of living entities (the conatus has nothing par ticularly 
‘vital’ about it), a potential which Maupertuis, Diderot and others 
witnessed in Leeuwenhoek and Hartsoeker’s spermatozoa, Réaumur’s 
chrysalids, Bonnet’s aphids, Trembley’s polyps, or the ‘animalcules’ 
of the anguillard, Needham.48
Let us return to Maupertuis’ train of argument. The notion of 
matter containing within it an intelligent principle actually presup-
poses a notion of intelligence, Maupertuis points out: a unified, 
45) Maupertuis asks from what stage onwards the fetus possesses a soul, and wisely 
dismisses the question as an artificial one (§ LIX, 178).
46) John Toland, Letters to Serena (London, 1704), Letter V, “Motion essential to 
Matter,” 163-239. Tristan Dagron, in his new study Toland et Leibniz. L’invention 
du néo-spinozisme (Paris, 2009), argues that Toland is less a materialist interpreter of 
Spinoza than he is an interlocutor of Leibniz’s who develops in debate with the latter 
a new, ‘endowed’ concept of matter.
47) Jacques Roger, Les sciences de la vie dans la pensée française au XVIIIe siècle [Paris, 
third edition 1993], 479. As Cassirer put it, “In his approach to the concept of the 
monad Maupertuis does not attempt to conceive the fundamental units of which all 
natural processes consist as metaphysical points—as Leibniz had done—but as physi-
cal points. In order to arrive at these units we need not depart from the corporeal 
world as such, but we must enlarge the concept of matter in such a way that it does 
not exclude the basic facts of consciousness” (e Philosophy of the Enlightenent, trans. 
Fritz C.A. Kölln & James P. Pettegrove [Princeton, 1951], 88).
48) Cf. Système, § XL, 162.
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indivisible notion of intelligence (he does not give a particular def-
inition of what he means by this, but the Cartesian echoes are fairly 
clear, just as the monadological overtones are at other times). But 
why can’t we see that our own intelligence actually exists in a graded 
set of degrees? Our levels of conscious awareness are variable, in 
both senses of the term: they are changing, but also able to extend 
over a wide spectrum ranging from sleep to wakefulness (§ LXII, 
180-181). In other words, we should not worry about attributing 
intelligence to the elements of matter, since our own ‘total’ intelli-
gence is manifold and changing. And what is the contrary view, 
which denies any intelligence to the constituent ‘atoms’ and indeed 
reduces the workings of the universe to atoms and chance? Epi-
curean atheism, the system of the “freethinkers (libertins) of the 
present day” (§ LXIV, 182-183). This is less an instance of the inex-
tricability of biological and theological concerns in early modernity 
than it is a deliberate strategic move on Maupertuis’ part: when 
advancing a controversial view about the mind, organic bodies, intel-
ligence, liberty and necessity, and so forth, it is extremely useful to 
be able to counterpose this view to a recognizably ‘Epicurean’, ‘Spi-
nozist’ or otherwise materialist position.49 So the attribution of a 
form of intelligence (instinct, memory, etc.) to matter or rather the 
‘molecule’ is not meant as a self-consciously materialist affirma tion 
by Maupertuis (who was comfortable using Epicurean-Lucretian 
argu ments against final causes in nature in earlier publications such 
as the 1750 Essai de cosmologie). The fact that living matter pos-
sesses a kind of potential (formative or generative, like a Bildung-
strieb or nisus formativus) is chiefly for him evidence of a kind of 
Mind or Intelligence. Without such a principle, the body could not 
develop as an autonomous whole; all bodies would have been con-
tinuously developing or fully formed since Creation.
But the predominant (call it ‘Cartesian’) conception that  intelligence 
has to be distinct from the properties of a material component, 
49) Anthony Collins thus distinguishes his (quite radical) determinism from the Epi-
curean doctrine of atoms and chance in his Philosophical Inquiry concerning Human 
Liberty (London, 1717); Joseph Priestley suggests in his Disquisitions Relating to Mat-
ter and Spirit (London, 1777) that compliance with substance dualism is a Catholic 
tenet, not part of core Christian commitments.
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even a living material component such as the molecule, needs fur-
ther rebuttal. According to this predominant view, our ‘sense of 
unity’, our ‘inner sense’ (a notion going back to Augustine50) can-
not have a manifold, composite origin. Maupertuis elegantly sug-
gests that when all these elements, each possessing its own desire 
and perception, are gathered together as a unity, the result is an 
individual perception which is stronger and more perfect than any 
particular elementary perception,51 since these have lost their “par-
ticular sense of self ”52—a kind of holism. This is why we have no 
direct experience of the origin of the elements of which we are 
composed, “our origin must be lost to us” (ibid.). A given quan-
tity of elementary parts will always produce an equivalent quantity 
of concurrent perceptions: the same temperament, aversions, and 
talents …53
All of this sounds rather far removed from Maupertuis the ‘fore-
runner of genetics’ or of Darwinism, as he was once known. But 
within the same discussion he turns to the informational aspect of 
this notion of ‘elementary perceptions’ and suggests that it explains 
why certain cognitive or intellectual traits of a parent are present 
in the mind (“soul”) of a child, or why a well-bred hunting dog 
produces offspring who are equally good at hunting.54 Maupertuis 
considers a great deal of genetic variety—he studied various cases 
of hereditary anomalies, from albinos to the Ruhe family in  Berlin, 
which exhibited the condition of polydactyly (specifically six  fingers 
on one hand) for several generations of the descendants of  Elisabeth 
Horstmann, and he calculated the chances of it being hereditary55—
but what it implies for him in this context is that neither chance, 
nor divine design are the relevant sorts of explanations for the com-
bination of stability and variety that he witnesses therein.
50) Augustine, De libero arbitrio, II, 3, 5.
51) David Beeson sees this as a “major concession to materialism” (Maupertuis, 212).
52) Maupertuis, Système, § LIV, 172.
53) Maupertuis continues (§ LVII, 176) with a rather obscure consideration of the 
possibility of education (and ethics) given this determined genetic structure.
54) Ibid., § LVI, 174.
55) Lettre XIV, “Sur la génération des animaux,” in Œuvres, vol. 2, p. 267; in the trans-
lation appended to Michael Hoffheimer, “Maupertuis and the Eighteenth-Century 
Critique of Preexistence,” Journal of the History of Biology, 15 (1982), 142.
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Granted, “the first production of any system is a miracle.”56 But 
God does not have the resources to produce a miracle each time a 
new body is produced. There must be a specific formal explanation 
for the workings of organic bodies (Maupertuis’ particular concern 
is with biological development, not with organismic laws or the 
principle that distinguishes living from non-living matter). How 
could other systems of generation explain phenomena that he has 
witnessed such as resemblance through heredity, monsters, hybrids 
or métis?57 A recurrent anomaly such as the presence of six fingers 
on one hand across several generations, refutes preformationism, 
the system according to which the child is fully contained (formed) 
in paternal semen, or in the maternal ovum. On Maupertuis’ view, 
it is an accidental material arrangement which is then repeated as 
a pattern, until a stronger pattern replaces it.58 But he is not spe-
cifically concerned with the mode in which the seminal principles 
are arranged. Other processes of generation may exist as well, 
 governing the growth of “other animalcules which can be found 
swarming in most fluids.”59 Neither parthenogenesis nor spontane-
ous generation present any difficulty for his system: if there is such 
a thing as spontaneous generation, it does not affect Maupertuis’ 
thesis that a new individual is produced by the arrangement of seeds 
(semences) in combination.60 We can treat the original production 
as miraculous,61 but if we consider molecules as possessing the three 
key properties of desire, aversion and memory, then we can under-
stand the process by which they combine in regular, coherent ways: 
“In matter’s initial state of fluidity, every element placed itself in 
56) Ibid., § XXX, 157.
57) Ibid., § XXXII, 158.
58) Ibid., §§ XXXVII, 160-161, XLV, 164. Jacques Roger considers this to be “the first 
complete statement of generalized transformism” (Les sciences de la vie, 484).
59) Maupertuis, Système, § XL, 162.
60) Ibid., § XLVI, 165. In most species, these reproductive elements are to be found 
in certain secretions; but apparently in other species, these éléments propres à s’unir 
d’une certaine manière are to be found either within a single individual, or outside of 
the individual-to-be-produced (ibid.). Maupertuis refers (§ XLVII, 168) to Buffon, 
Histoire naturelle II, 8-9 for an analysis of the same fact with plants.
61) Ibid., § XXX, 157.
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the most suitable location to form bodies which no longer show 
traces of their formation.”62
A key feature of Maupertuis’ account of genetic transmission is 
what he calls, self-consciously acknowledging the extent to which 
he cannot escape analogy in his vocabulary, the memory of the mole-
cule. Is this a kind of conscious memory or more of one might 
term a ‘positional’ memory? It is clear that for Maupertuis the 
‘endowed’ molecules possess a kind of positional memory combined 
with a drive (“desire,” “instinct”) to combine with other molecules 
in structurally coherent ways. As Shirley Roe puts it, “By ‘remem-
bering’ their former locations and by possessing an instinct to unite, 
the seminal particles would be able to arrange themselves into an 
embryo in the proper fashion.”63 Even the sterility of mules can be 
explained thus: the particles retain the memory, the ‘habit’ so to 
speak of their former location in a mare or a donkey, but their 
being located in the new formation (a mule) has the consequence 
that the organism cannot reproduce. But in fact the memory of 
Maupertuis’ molecules is not strictly positional, as François Jacob 
observed: if we compare them with Buffon’s “organic molecules,” 
the memory possessed by Maupertuis’ endowed molecules is indis-
tinguishably material (spatial, positional) and psychic, whereas that 
possessed by Buffon’s organic molecules is restrictively positional 
and structural.64 Diderot himself considers that Buffon’s organic 
molecules are easier to accept scientifically because Buffon does not 
attribute ‘psychic’ properties to them such as intelligence or mem-
ory. 
In sum, Maupertuis’ concept of molecules ‘endowed’ with higher-
level properties is a distinctive claim, contrasting both with a  classic 
atomistic model in which basic elements (“éléments bruts”) lacking 
any form of intelligence or appetition form more complex bodies 
throughout the universe, in and through their chance e ncounters, 
62) Ibid., § LI, 170.
63) Shirley Roe, Matter, Life, and Generation. Eighteenth-century Embryology and the 
Haller-Wolff Debate (Cambridge, 1981), 15; similar summary in James L. Larson, 
Interpreting Nature: e Science of Living Form from Linnaeus to Kant (Baltimore, 
1994), 136.
64) François Jacob, La logique du vivant. Une histoire de l’hérédité (Paris, 1970), 92-93.
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and with a voluntaristic ‘design’ claim in which a Supreme Being, 
distinct from matter, makes use of the elements of matter like an 
architect uses stone to make buildings. In Maupertuis’ vision, the 
elements themselves, “endowed with intelligence, arrange and unite 
themselves in order to fulfill the aims of the Creator.”65
3. Diderot’s Criticisms
Diderot rejects the idea of endowed molecules, at least in its essen-
tial form as stated by Maupertuis.66 His arguments focus on the 
positions expressed in sections LII, LIII, and LIV. In order to chal-
lenge Maupertuis’ hypothesis, which he accepts at the level of its 
“empirical” benefits but not as an overall “speculative” claim, he 
seeks to push it as far as it can go; whether we agree with Mau-
pertuis or Buffon, Diderot says, what is important is the extent to 
which these hypotheses on generation contribute to the progress of 
“experimental physics, rational philosophy, and the discovery and 
explanation of the phenomena of organization”67—with the latter 
term referring to biological structure. In addition he is ironic about 
Maupertuis’ fears of falling into materialism (or of being taken as 
such).
The problem with Maupertuis, for Diderot, was that his mole-
cules seemed to have been spiritualized (recalling La Mettrie’s dis-
tinction), whereas he, Diderot, wanted to materialize the realm of 
the spiritual (i.e. the mental): first there is matter and motion, and 
gradually, through corpuscular arrangements of increasing complex-
ity—which he terms “organization”—the phenomena or rather fac-
ulties of desire, aversion, memory, etc., are added on. Now, this 
seems rather mechanistic in contrast to Maupertuis; and indeed at 
65) Maupertuis, Système, § LXVII, 183-184.
66) Marx W. Wartofsky, “Diderot and the Development of Materialist Monism,” 
Diderot Studies, 2 (1952), 292-293 is still one of the best commentaries on the topic. 
(It was reprinted in Wartofsky, Models. Representation and the Scientific Understanding, 
Boston Studies in Philosophy of Science, vol. 48 [Dordrecht, 1979].)
67) Pensées sur l’interprétation de la nature (Paris, 1753/1754), § XII; hereafter Pensées 
followed by the section number (and page numbers in the Œuvres complètes).
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this point Diderot introduces the “dull sensitivity” (sensibilité sourde) 
by means of which all molecules have their place, or fit into place. 
To be precise, Diderot allows for two properties: this rudimentary 
form of sensitivity, and an “automatic restlessness” (inquiétude auto-
mate) which leads the molecules into a variety of possible locations.68 
In combination, these two ‘basic’ properties are meant to account 
for the same variety of organic forms as Maupertuis’ multiple 
 prop erties (desire, aversion, intelligence etc.). Maupertuis’ basic prop-
erties are more ‘teleological’ than Diderot’s, and overall are too exces-
sive: Diderot thinks that Maupertuis could have stopped at mass, 
motion—and this “mute” or “dull” sensitivity. Of course, Diderot 
wavers on the exact locus of this sensitivity: does it belong to  matter 
as a whole, or only to organized matter?
In some texts, Diderot suggests that “sensitivity or touch is com-
mon to all beings,” attributes sensitivity to the molecule, or to mat-
ter as a whole; in his entry “Leibnitzianisme” in the Encyclopédie, 
he brings together Aristotle’s entelechy, Leibniz’s monads, and “sen-
sitivity as a general property of matter.”69 But in others, such as the 
1765 Letter to Duclos, he denies that sensitivity can be a property 
of a molecule, specifically because it can only be a property of mat-
ter itself, and complicates the issue further by introducing a dis-
tinction between “inert” sensitivity and “active” sensitivity.70 In Le 
Rêve de d’Alembert, Diderot presents the unity of the person as the 
result of “the gradual apposition of several sensitive molecules”71; 
68) Diderot, Pensées, § LI, in Œuvres complètes, IX, 84. A variety of texts of this period, 
whether ‘chemical’ (Rouelle, Venel), ‘medical’ (Sauvages, Bordeu) or other (Mauper-
tuis and here Diderot) describe molecules as agitated by an internal motion, in some 
cases viewed as characteristic of ‘Life’. us François Boissier de Sauvages, in his 1752 
Dissertation sur les médicaments qui affectent certaines parties du corps humain plutôt que 
d’autres, explains that medicines work on the body because of the internal agitation 
of their molecules (in Sauvages, Les Chefs-d’œuvre de Monsieur de Sauvages, ou Recueil 
de dissertations qui ont remporté le prix dans différentes Académies [Lausanne and Lyon, 
2 vols., 1770], II, 20.)
69) Diderot, Éléments de physiologie, in Œuvres complètes, XVII, 308; “Leibnitzianisme,” 
Encyclopédie, IX (1765), 371.
70) “Lettre à Duclos,” October 10 1765, in Diderot, Correspondance, ed. Georges Roth, 
vol. 5 (Paris, 1959), 141.
71) Diderot, Rêve de D’Alembert, in Œuvres complètes, XVII, 134.
59C.T. Wolfe / Early Science and Medicine 15 (2010) 38-65
“each sensitive molecule possessed its self before the application; 
but how did it lose it, and how, out of all these losses, did the con-
sciousness of a whole result?” (ibid.) An answer to this question, 
why the molecules connect to one another, is provided by Mauper-
tuis: there is a kind of agreement or ‘contract’ between them such 
that the perception of each element is combined with the percep-
tions of the others. The result, as we have seen, is “an individual 
perception which is stronger and more perfect than any particular 
elementary perception.”72
It is in this context that Maupertuis introduces the metaphor of 
the bee-swarm, which will prove to be one of the most successful 
and evocative images of organic unity in the eighteenth century, in 
various renditions, some more organismic, some more mechanistic: 
“Thus an army seen from a distance might appear to us as a great 
animal; thus a bee-swarm, when the bees are assembled and united 
on the branch of a tree, only presents to our gaze a body lacking 
any resemblance to the individuals which composed it.”73 While 
Diderot also makes use of this image of organic unity as a com-
posite of living parts, he emphasizes somewhat disingenuously that 
for Maupertuis it illustrates the ‘totalizing’ principle that all mole-
cules form a whole with a unified perception—a sense of the whole 
(le Tout) which, Diderot claims, will “force [Maupertuis] to admit 
that the world can be God.”74 Indeed, the accusation that a strong 
72) Système, § LIV, 172; compare the overtly political metaphor used in the earlier Vénus 
physique, when Maupertuis asks if instinct, “like the spirit of a Republic,” is “present 
throughout the parts of the body, or, like in a Monarchic state, if it only belongs to 
one indivisible part?” (Vénus physique, final chapter, § II , in Œuvres, vol. 2, 132).
73) Système, § LI, 170-171. Bordeu’s 1751 Recherches anatomiques sur les glandes also 
presents this image (but the book was written over several years prior to this date); the 
vitalist physician Ménuret de Chambaud discusses Bordeu and Ménuret’s respective 
claims to priority in the Encyclopédie article “Observation”; finally, Diderot returns to 
the image at length in his 1769 opus Le Rêve de d’Alembert. For comparison between 
these authors’ usage of the image of the bee-swarm, see Colas Duflo, “Diderot et 
Ménuret de Chambaud,” Recherches sur Diderot et sur l’Encyclopédie, 34 (avril 2003), 
25-44; Charles Wolfe & Motoichi Terada, “e ‘Animal Economy’ as Object and 
Program in Montpellier Vitalism,” Science in Context 21:4 (December 2008), special 
issue on Medical Vitalism in the Enlightenment, 537-579, here, 550-554.
74) Diderot, Pensées, § L, in Œuvres complètes, IX, 82.
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notion of the Whole entails the collapse of individual perceptions 
and thus individuality itself into a general perception was a stan-
dard argument against Spinoza, running at least from Bayle and 
Leibniz to German Idealism.
Diderot refers to Maupertuis’ position provocatively as “the most 
alluring (séduisante) kind of materialism,”75 referring specifically to 
the notion I have referred to here as ‘endowed molecules’. As we 
have seen, he deems these molecules to be over-laden with proper-
ties, and prefers a system based on a more minimal “dull sensitiv-
ity” (which of course is simply another form of materialism, perhaps 
a purer one). So on the one hand Diderot radicalizes Maupertuis’ 
position, towards an “alluring” materialism (while ironically reproach-
ing him for falling into this trap); on the other hand he looks for 
a less metaphysically invested form of the same ‘vital materialist’ 
position. By seeking to force Maupertuis to take a stance on the 
notion of the Whole, it is possible that Diderot is trying to achieve 
an even more total victory for materialism: because either Mauper-
tuis accepts it (and then Spinozism is true) or he rejects it, so that 
the universe is not an ordered whole (and then Lucretianism is 
true).76
4. Maupertuis’ Response
From the outset77 Diderot had declared that he intended to push 
Maupertuis’ hypotheses to their ultimate … or absurd conclusion. 
He claims that it is necessary to do so, in order to unmask the “ter-
rible consequences” of the Erlangen Doctor’s theory. Maupertuis 
responds that if one were not already convinced of the sincerity of 
Diderot’s religious beliefs, one might suspect that his intention is 
not so much to overturn his own theory as to “himself draw these 
consequences he calls terrible from it.”78 Indeed, if we open the 
75) Ibid., § LI, in Œuvres complètes, IX, 84.
76) François Duchesneau appears to suggest something like this in La physiologie des 
Lumières. Empirisme, modèles et théories (e Hague, 1982), 253.
77) Diderot, Pensées sur l’interprétation de la nature, § L, in Œuvres complètes, IX, 77.
78) Maupertuis, Réponse, 197.
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works of respected authors who are no longer living, such as Des-
cartes or Malebranche, and apply Diderot’s method of inferring con-
sequences, the result would be that “Genesis is denied, and the 
freedom and power of God are nowhere to be found.”79 In any case, 
Maupertuis adds, all systems are fallible, because they are finite.80 
His retort to Diderot is that the latter’s materialism is a form of 
systematic abstraction just like Cartesianism.81 While this may appear 
merely polemical, it is nevertheless the expression of a moderate 
skepticism which characterizes Maupertuis’ argumentation through-
out his intellectual career, not just in response to Cartesianism (or 
materialism) but also as a way of “leveling the playing field”82 when 
confronted by the competing claims of Newtonians and Leibniz-
ians, in his twofold capacity as a natural philosopher and the Pres-
ident of the Berlin Academy.
But the key component in Maupertuis’ response to Diderot is a 
notion which is equally important in Diderot’s own thought, that 
of the Whole (le Tout).83 It is because both Maupertuis and Diderot 
are committed to a notion of the universe as a substantial Whole 
that they are ‘neo-Spinozists’ in a broad sense (in addition to the 
specific, idiosyncratic sense manifest, e.g. in Diderot’s article “Spino-
sistes” in the Encyclopédie, in which so-called “modern Spinozists” 
are described as holding a version of the theory of biological epigen-
esis), to use the term coined by Paul Vernière.84 In this integrated, 
79) Ibid., 198.
80) Ibid., 199-200.
81) Beeson, Maupertuis, 251. Maupertuis makes this point at greater length in his Let-
ter VII, ‘On Systems’ (Lettres de Maupertuis, 48-54).
82) Shank, e Newton Wars, 287.
83) For an excellent brief presentation see Jean-Claude Bourdin, “Tout, le tout,” in 
Bourdin, Annie Ibrahim et al., eds., L’Encyclopédie du Rêve de D’Alembert (Paris, 2006), 
364-368.
84) Paul Vernière introduced the influential (and controversial) category of ‘neo- 
Spinozism’ in his Spinoza et la pensée française avant la Révolution (Paris, 1954, 2nd 
edition 1982); he defines it as a form of holist materialism founded on the life sciences 
rather than on a priori metaphysical speculation (529). At least Diderot’s entry “Spi-
nosistes” corresponds to this description. Vernière describes Diderot and Maupertuis 
as neo-Spi nozists in an editorial note to his edition of Diderot, Œuvres philosophiques 
(Paris, 1961), 229. For more extensive discussions of Diderot’s usage of Spinoza and 
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causally closed universe, there is no particular demarcation between 
dead and living matter.
What is this notion of the Whole and how does it function in 
Maupertuis’ response?
First, according to Maupertuis, Diderot is vague in his usage of 
terms like “the Whole.”85 If (a) the whole, le tout, is that which 
“leaves nothing beyond itself ” (ne laisse rien au delà), the question 
of whether or not the universe is a whole or not is irrelevant to 
the issue; if (b) a whole, un tout, is a regular edifice, an assemblage 
of proportionate parts, the previous question can be answered affir-
matively or negatively.86 If the answer is No, God’s existence will 
not be put into question, any more than it was by pious authors 
such as Malebranche, for whom the universe was a heap of ruins.87 
If the answer is Yes, it does not follow that this “copulation of per-
ceptions” necessarily extends to the entire Universe (ibid.). Accord-
ing to Diderot, all systems ultimately are founded on reasoning by 
analogy; this is mistaken in Maupertuis’ view, since analogy will 
never establish truth or falsehood (a somewhat odd position to take 
for someone whose most significant description of the molecule 
explicitly relied on analogy).
Second, certain modern philosophers, following the principle that 
Nature makes no leaps, view matter as one single continuous piece 
(bloc). If Diderot meant this notion of continuity when he spoke 
of the Whole, one should reply that reason and experience prove 
that there are vacuums in Nature; bodies are merely scattered in 
space.88 Maupertuis insists that regardless of the degree of continu-
ity of the universe, any real difference between le continu and le 
disséminé will simply be a matter of distance between parts: hence 
 Spinozism, see Alexandre Métraux, “Über Denis Diderots physiologisch interpretierten 
Spinoza,” Studia Spinozana, 10 (1994), 121-134 and John Zammito, “Naturalizm 
XVIII Wieku. Spinozyzm w Filozofiach nauki Diderota i Herdera,” in Rozum i S’wiat: 
Herder i filozofia XVIII, XIX i XX wieku, eds. Marion Heinz, Maciej Potepa, Zbigniew 
Zwolin’ski (Warsaw, 2004), 117-146.
85) Maupertuis, Réponse, 204.
86) Ibid., 205.
87) Ibid., 206.
88) Ibid., 207.
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his cherished elements will continue to exist. Degrees of density 
exist for our perception. The microscope refutes the claim of  absolute 
continuity, since it shows distance between apparently homogeneous, 
compact parts.89 (Maupertuis does not seem to have undertaken 
microscopic observations himself, relying instead on the reports of 
Needham’s “infusoires.”)
If one follows another sense of Diderot’s tout, i.e., Spinoza’s God, 
then Dr Baumann will assuredly deny that the universe is a whole.90 
Maupertuis refuses to believe that there is anything perilous in his 
system of elementary perceptions, and as such is happy to extend 
it also to the largest bodies in the universe, without thereby making 
gods of them. He criticizes Diderot for believing that he, Mauper-
tuis, is wrong in attributing perception to matter, while on his part 
attributing sensation to matter; with some degree of justification (at 
least Diderot requires a good deal of interpreting here) he consid-
ers this to be a lapse into dualism.91 There is of course a running 
ideological thread here, which would be straightforward if it were 
simply a matter of the two authors trading accusations of atheism, 
materialism and Spinozism, as they do, but is more complicated 
because it involves at least three other rhetorical dimensions. Namely, 
(a) praise for the very same ideas: Diderot describes ‘Dr Baumann’s’ 
“Erlangen dissertation” as being “full of new and singular ideas,” 
and recommends that “we read his work to learn how to reconcile 
the boldest philosophical ideas with the deepest respect for religion”92); 
(b) Diderot also suggests that Maupertuis should ‘stick to biology’ 
and not address the status of the soul: “if Dr Baumann only kept 
his system to its rightful limits, and applied his ideas strictly to the 
89) Ibid., 207-208.
90) Ibid., 208.
91) Ibid., respectively 209, 212. For an attempt to systematize Diderot on this issue 
(arguing that he is a substance monist but a functional dualist for whom there are levels 
of complexity in sensitivity), see Jean Deprun, “L’anthropologie de Diderot: monisme 
métaphysique et dualisme fonctionnel,” in A. Mango, ed., Diderot. Il politico, il filosofo, 
lo scrittore (Milan, 1986), 115-122.
92) Diderot, Pensées, § L, in Œuvres complètes, IX, 79. On the ideological dimension see 
Aram Vartanian, “Diderot et Maupertuis,” Revue internationale de philosophie 38:148-
149 (1984), 46-66—more as a ‘stimulant’ than as a guide to Maupertuis or Diderot.
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formation of animals…”93; (c) lastly, as we have seen, he also delib-
erately ‘overdetermines’ what Maupertuis intended.
5. Stakes of the Debate
Maupertuis’ molecules are a significant ‘conceptual persona’ in the 
history of vital minima, whether this history is construed as a series 
of developments and complexifications in matter theory, or a more 
qualitative, metaphysically laden pre-history of Lavoisian chemistry. 
They are of course not alone in the relevant natural-philosophical 
landscape; in addition to Gassendi’s semina rerum and Glisson’s 
 appetitive, perceiving fibres mentioned at the beginning, a more 
extensive study would have to discuss Buffon’s organic molecules, 
Albrecht von Haller’s fibres and the various treatments of molecules 
in Stahlian and post-Stahlian chemistry, notably Gabriel-François 
Venel’s “molécules intégrantes,” which he distinguishes from the 
‘masses, forces and qualities’ which are basic for physics.94 Admit-
tedly, Venel’s chemical definition of living bodies as “mucous bod-
ies” (corps muqueux) which undergo “fermentation” itself resolves 
these bodies into “masses of organic molecules” (amas de molécules 
organiques).95
Should we then grant particular significance to the idea of attri-
bution or endowment of properties? What exactly is the nature of 
the material substrate of the attributes of desire, memory, aversion, 
intelligence and instinct? It is not obvious exactly at which level 
Maupertuis wishes to articulate his theory: is it a system of  generation 
among others, or a ‘meta-theory’ of generation? He clearly wishes 
to express these ideas at a greater level of abstraction than some 
others, while however invoking empirical data. But he also is more 
ambitious than he needs to be, as Diderot will put it, and seeks to 
provide a metaphysical mooring-point for his theory of generation. 
Diderot appears to be the more methodologically sophisticated of 
93) Diderot, Pensées, § LI, in Œuvres complètes, IX, 83.
94) Venel, “Chymie,” Encyclopédie, III (1753), 411b, 416a. On chemistry in the mid-
eighteenth century in France, see Kubbinga, Histoire, 440-441.
95) Venel, “Muqueux, corps (chymie),” Encyclopédie, X (1765), 865b.
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the two, since rather than attributing a host of properties to the 
element (molecule) directly, he recognizes that the sensitivity of an 
organic being must be explained in terms of its nervous system and 
the way in which it relates to the individuality or selfhood of this 
being. In addition, he does not “endow” matter with what Mau-
pertuis himself called “non-physical” attributes96—that is, phenom-
enological properties of matter.
Maupertuis’ endowed molecules ultimately tend towards a homun-
cular theory of an infinitely small entity which possesses (even if 
only by analogy) the attributes we are familiar with from our own 
experience. Each molecule possesses a “self ” and memories of this 
“self ” which gradually fade away as the molecule enters into increas-
ingly complex arrangements, in a totality, the sense of self of which 
is stronger than that of the element. Philosophically, this seems 
open to the charge of pan-psychism (as stated at least as early as 
Janet’s essay in the late nineteenth century). But if understood in 
heuristic terms, the idea of attributing informational properties to 
organic, organized matter is ironically more ‘realistic’ than Dider-
ot’s vast organic cosmogony. Conversely, the idea that the proper-
ties of complex living beings can only be attributed to the whole, 
the organisation, the network, seems much more convincing to us 
than Leibnizian, homuncular argumentation (however naturalized). 
Emergentist theories, to use contemporary terminology,97 have the 
advantage that they take into account the properties of the constit-
uent parts, including in a reductionist sense, but then seek to study 
the consequences of their interaction.
96) Système, § XXVIII, 155.
97) For a brief application of the term ‘emergentism’ to Maupertuis, see T.S. Hall, 
Ideas of Life and Matter. Studies in the History of General Physiology, vol. 2 (Chicago, 
1969), 26-28. For a more extensive account of eighteenth-century models of organic 
life as ‘organizational’ (and thus beyond the split between reduction and emergence), 
see Wolfe and Terada, “e Animal Economy,” 558-574.
